



POLICY PAPER

# NATO BRUSSELS SUMMIT

PROSPECTS AND OPPORTUNITIES

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## INTRODUCTION

The next NATO Summit meeting will be held in Brussels on 11–12 July. The heads of state and government will be taking stock of the decisions of the Wales and Warsaw Summits and implement further the adaptation of the Alliance to respond to the wide range of 21st-century security challenges. Adapting NATO is a long, continuous process with multiple aims. The decisions of the forthcoming Summit will need to focus on ensuring its stronger coherence.

In recent years, NATO has made good progress in strengthening its deterrence and defence posture on the Eastern flank, including establishing an allied land component presence there. This work is not yet complete and it is important to increase the overall awareness of “deterrence culture” within the Alliance. Although there will be no milestone decisions comparable with the Warsaw Summit’s decision on the establishment of enhanced Forward Presence, the Brussels Summit will focus on the strategic issues of reinforcement, readiness and speed of decision-making, but also on burden-sharing, NATO-EU relations, military mobility, cyber defence and the Open Door policy. The Summit will make decisions on how to strengthen collective defence and response to threats and security challenges in a 360-degree approach to security.

In the weeks before the Summit, NATO capitals and officials face many difficult discussions that are relevant to its success. NATO members should once again reiterate that the Alliance is strong, united, prepared and ready to deal with any threats against its territory at any time and by any means.

This policy paper examines the most pressing topics related to the Summit, makes recommendations on the issues relevant to its preparation, and specifically looks at security issues in the Baltic Sea region.

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## 1. BURDEN-SHARING

At the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, the Allies declared that the Alliance “will aim to move towards the existing NATO guideline of spending 2% of GDP on defence within a decade, with a view to fulfilling NATO capability priorities.”<sup>1</sup>

The US has high expectations that all Allies will remain committed to the agreed target. President Donald Trump has repeatedly said that he might reconsider the US relationship with NATO if the European Allies do not take more responsibility and start sharing the burden more fairly. As NATO’s Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, stated recently, “this is about the credibility of our Alliance, and it is about fair burden sharing between Allies”.<sup>2</sup>

In 2017 the defence expenditure of NATO’s European members and Canada accounted for an average of 1.45% of their GDP, while for the US the proportion was 3.57%. According to 2017 estimates, only four members fulfilled the 2% requirement, while four countries spent less than 1%.<sup>3</sup> In 2018, eight NATO nations are expected to meet the 2% target. However, it is highly unlikely that all Allies will increase their military expenditure to meet the agreed objective by 2024—only 15 countries are expected to get to that level.<sup>4</sup> The issue of burden-sharing will not leave the table as long as the US continues to contribute a large majority of NATO’s total military spending, and will become even more dramatic for Allies in the European Union following Brexit, when non-EU NATO countries (the US, the UK, Turkey, Canada and Norway) will contribute more than 80% of the total budget.

At the same time, the US commitment to European security and defence has remained solid. US expenditure on the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI), which was introduced by President Barack Obama in 2014,

<sup>1</sup> NATO, “[The Wales Declaration on the Transatlantic Bond](#)”, Press Release (2014) 122, 5 September 2014.

<sup>2</sup> NATO, “[Joint press conference with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the Prime Minister of the Netherlands, Mark Rutte](#)”, Press Release, 19 April 2018.

<sup>3</sup> “[Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries \(2009–2017\)](#)”, Press Release (2018) 016, 15 March 2018.

<sup>4</sup> NATO, “[NATO Defence Ministers take decisions to strengthen the Alliance](#)”, 15 February 2018.

has risen to 4.6 billion US dollars in 2018 and will increase to 6.5 billion dollars in 2019.<sup>5</sup> The US has increased the presence of its troops in Europe by an additional armoured brigade headquartered in Poland and has prepositioned equipment in Western Europe.

- *The Summit should highlight the progress achieved in recent years in turning the corner on defence spending, while recognising that this has not yet occurred across the whole of the Alliance. Spending 2% of GDP on defence is economically and financially doable for the countries that currently spend less. The message should therefore be clear: defence expenditure must be further increased, and this commitment should be backed up with national plans to achieve commonly agreed goals. European leaders must show political will and leadership to convince their electorates that Europe needs to do more militarily to regain credibility on Europe's defence.*
- *The US should highlight a message that fair burden-sharing is about a more equal contribution to the common cause of European and transatlantic security by all Allies. On the other hand, raising the issue of the 2% target at the Summit in a way that*

*The message should be clear: defence expenditure must be further increased, and this commitment should be backed up with national plans to achieve commonly agreed goals*

*makes negative headlines would do a great disservice to NATO's common cause, demonstrating disunity in the Alliance.*

<sup>5</sup> Jen Judson, "[Funding to deter Russia reaches \\$6.5B in FY19 defense budget request](#)", *Defense News*, 12 February 2018.

## 2. DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE POLICY

Following the decisions taken since 2014, NATO's ability to respond to the threats the Allies are facing has visibly improved. As it continues to face a resurgent Russia whose attitude towards the Allies remains hostile, an examination of the Alliance's adaptation thus far reveals that it still has important

*The Summit needs to provide guidance on addressing the existing deficiencies in NATO's overall posture to guarantee more credible collective defence*

vulnerabilities vis-à-vis Russia. The Summit needs to provide guidance on addressing the existing deficiencies in NATO's overall posture to guarantee more credible collective defence.

### 2.1 DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE POSTURE IN THE BALTIC REGION

The decision in Warsaw on enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) battlegroups in the Baltic states and Poland sent a clear message of Allied unity and solidarity. These forces serve as a collective tripwire to deter hostile actions by Russia and are meant to trigger "an immediate Allied response to any aggression".<sup>6</sup> Being integrated within their respective host nation's force structures, the mechanised eFP battlegroups are also equipped and supplied to participate, if necessary, in the military defence of the region.<sup>7</sup>

However, eFP consists of land troops only and is not supported by maritime and air assets, including air defence. This makes it imperative that NATO focuses more on air and maritime

<sup>6</sup> NATO, "[Warsaw Summit Communiqué, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8-9 July 2016](#)", Press Release (2016) 100, 9 July 2016.

<sup>7</sup> For example, the eFP battlegroup in Estonia forms part of the 1st Estonian Brigade.

aspects—including planning and availability of military capabilities—related to the Baltic Sea region. This should be seen not only from the perspective of backing up the battlegroups but, rather, the overall joint enablement of the whole defence of the Baltic area.

In the air domain, NATO has conducted the Baltic Air Policing (BAP) mission in the airspace of the three Baltic states since they joined the Alliance in 2004, and enhanced air policing following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Air policing is a purely peacetime task: aircraft deployed to the region on a rotational basis do not have the authority to engage in combat, except in self-defence. Effective air defence, which requires comprehensive sensor coverage, the layering of ground-, sea- and air-based weapon systems, and robust command

*Air defence is the biggest military capability gap in the region*

and control is of key importance for a credible deterrence and defence posture in the region, including for ensuring Allied reinforcement in times of crisis. But the full range of systems required has proved prohibitively expensive for the Baltic states: air defence is the biggest military capability gap in the region. ICDS’s forthcoming study of Baltic air defence will make recommendations for both the Baltic states and the rest of NATO to address the challenge of this pressing capability shortfall.<sup>8</sup>

Furthermore, the Alliance needs to ensure maritime deterrence through persistent and credible NATO naval presence in the Baltic Sea. Such a presence is important in avoiding a situation in which Russia could perceive the Baltic Sea as part of its “sphere of influence”.

<sup>8</sup> Christopher Harper, Tony Lawrence and Sven Sakkov, *Air Defence of the Baltic States* (Tallinn: ICDS, May 2018 (forthcoming)).

- *NATO should acknowledge the urgent need to address the key capability shortfalls in Baltic air defence and work together with the Baltic states to find common solutions with the aim of reorganising BAP into a Baltic Air Defence Mission.*
- *The Summit should also task military authorities to design plans for maritime presence in the region that would support the overall deterrence posture.*

## 2.2 NATO COMMAND STRUCTURE AND FORCE STRUCTURE

One of the expected deliverables of the Brussels Summit is agreement on the details of the adaptation of the NATO Command Structure (NCS) to ensure its ability to fulfil all the Alliance’s tasks—first and foremost, the requirement to be ready for collective defence. The agreements reached so far include a new Command for the Atlantic to ensure the security of maritime lines of communication between Europe and North America, which will be located in Norfolk, Virginia. A second new command to be established will be the Joint Support and Enabling Command to improve the movement of troops and equipment within Europe, hosted by Germany in Ulm.<sup>9</sup> An overall increase in NCS personnel and greater emphasis on regional focus of the commands should also be agreed.

*The Alliance needs to ensure maritime deterrence through persistent and credible NATO naval presence in the Baltic Sea*

The reform of NCS will also result in changes to the NATO Force Structure (NFS). As part of this, the Alliance should ensure that proper command-and-control arrangements are in place for collective defence operations on the Eastern flank. This includes corps- and division-level headquarters with direct responsibility for the planning and execution of collective defence operations in the Baltic region. At the

<sup>9</sup> NATO, “[The NATO Command Structure](#)”, Factsheet, February 2018.

corps level, the Multinational Corps North-East, headquartered in Szczecin, Poland, is seen as a hub for the region. At the division level, the HQ

*The Alliance should ensure that proper command-and-control arrangements are in place for collective defence operations on the Eastern flank*

of the Multinational Division North-East in Elblag, Poland provides a useful element for the command of forces in the vicinity of the Suwałki Gap. However, a single divisional HQ is not sufficient due to the geography and the number of forces involved to cover the whole region.

- *The agreements on renewed NCS should be implemented speedily, including commitments by Allies concerning personnel and finance.*
- *An additional division-level HQ located on the territory of the Baltic states is required and should be agreed as part of the new NFS. This HQ should also have access to necessary division-level enabling capabilities.*

## 2.3 REINFORCEMENT AND READINESS

Having established a forward presence, the Alliance will need to make sure that adequate reinforcements are available to be deployed quickly to reinforce Allies under attack. This is necessary to ensure the credibility of both the trigger function of the eFP and the Alliance's deterrence posture as a whole. The present NATO strategy relies on the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) as first responder. But this is insufficient because the brigade-sized VJTF and its deployment is meant to send political signals rather than bear the brunt of actual defence of the Alliance's territory.

Boosting allied readiness was raised as a priority at the February 2018 meeting of Defence Ministers by the US, which proposed that the Allies collectively agree to commit to

having 30 land forces combat battalions, 30 squadrons of combat aircraft and 30 major naval combatants available to deploy within 30 days.<sup>10</sup> The overall aim must be that NATO will have larger forces identified and available to react with greater speed to an emerging crisis.

During the Cold War, exercises practising

deployment of troops to vulnerable regions in Europe formed part of the overall NATO deterrence and defence strategy. Having lost a lot of this expertise, the Alliance now needs to improve and exercise its ability to move troops and equipment. Live exercises based on advanced plans would also help to understand and address gaps both in planning and in the execution of plans.

- *The Alliance should develop plans to enable rapid reinforcement which go well beyond the VJTF. Such plans would need to cover the availability of forces and the speed of deployment, and include relevant realistic planning, exercises and work related to ensuring logistical support.*
- *The readiness of Allied forces needs to be enhanced and an agreement based on the US proposal would significantly boost NATO's rapid reaction capabilities.*

*The Alliance will need to make sure that adequate reinforcements are available...The overall aim must be that NATO will have larger forces identified and available to react with greater speed to an emerging crisis*

- *The Summit should provide guidance highlighting the need for further improvement in advanced planning for the defence of NATO's territory. The planning must also take into account Russia's anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities and*

<sup>10</sup> Julian E. Barnes, "[NATO Fears Its Forces Not Ready to Confront Russian Threat](#)", *The Wall Street Journal*, 28 March 2018.

*the need for the Alliance to be ready to conduct an entry operation into a non-permissive environment.*

- *An essential element of the reinforcement strategy would be periodic deployment exercises practising the movement of troops, including to the Baltic region. The Summit should initiate the launch of such live-deployment exercises.*
- *The Alliance's decision-making procedures need to be regularly exercised at all levels.*

## 2.4 NUCLEAR POLICY

Nuclear deterrence forms a core element of a credible deterrence and defence posture. In response to Russia's explicit nuclear threats, the Alliance is reassessing its nuclear policy. In the Warsaw Summit communiqué, the Alliance upgraded its nuclear declaratory policy for the first time since the end of the Cold War. The US Nuclear Posture Review published in 2018 seeks further to strengthen NATO nuclear deterrence capabilities.

*The Summit needs to send a strong and clear message on the role of nuclear weapons in the Alliance's security*

- *The Summit needs to send a strong and clear message on the role of nuclear weapons in the Alliance's security and to welcome the US plans to strengthen its commitments to NATO's nuclear deterrence.*

## 3. NATO-EU COOPERATION AND MILITARY MOBILITY

The Brussels Summit will be an opportunity to enhance further the relationship between NATO and the European Union. Since the Warsaw Summit, the EU has significantly increased its profile and activities in the defence field, including by the launch of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). Although political hurdles hindering relations

*The topic of military mobility has taken centre stage in NATO-EU cooperation*

between the two organisations have not disappeared, progress has been achieved, with over 70 cooperative projects agreed in recent years.<sup>11</sup> The summit will provide an opportunity to review progress in cooperative projects, as implementation must now be at the heart of the relationship.

Issues with military mobility were originally identified by the former commander of US Army Europe, Lieutenant General (ret.) Frederick "Ben" Hodges, who raised practical problems encountered during deployments of American forces to NATO's Eastern Flank.<sup>12</sup> Various bureaucratic and practical infrastructure-related obstacles to the movement of forces in Europe have now been widely recognised as a key shortfall and the topic of military mobility has taken centre stage in NATO-EU cooperation.

In addressing military mobility, the role of the EU is vital. The Netherlands leads a collaborative PESCO project to simplify and standardise cross-border military transportation

<sup>11</sup> European Defence Agency, "[New proposals for EU-NATO cooperation](#)", Brussels, 6 December 2017.

<sup>12</sup> "[Outgoing US Army Europe commander pushes for 'Military Schengen Zone'](#)", *Defense News*, 28 July 2017.

procedures.<sup>13</sup> The European Commission has also launched an initiative to take military requirements into account in developing and financing dual-use transport infrastructure.<sup>14</sup>

*The EU needs to take into account NATO requirements as large-scale movements of troops across European borders are most likely to happen under the auspices of the Alliance*

While infrastructure projects will take a long time to complete, streamlining and simplifying procedural and regulatory issues can achieve rapid results. The EU needs to take into account NATO requirements as large-scale movements of troops across European borders are most likely to happen under the auspices of the Alliance.

- *A joint NATO-EU declaration at the Summit by the leaders should reinforce the message that NATO and the EU, with 22 member states belonging to both organisations, complement each other in enhancing the security of Europe. This includes an understanding that the EU's new defence initiatives will also lead to a more capable Europe within NATO.*
- *Both the EU Council on 28–29 June and NATO's Brussels Summit should issue a military mobility pledge, in which member states of both organisations promise to simplify border-crossing procedures by issuing permits to move forces within five working days.<sup>15</sup>*

*Cyber needs to be fully integrated into the planning and conduct of NATO operations*

## 4. CYBER DEFENCE

At the Warsaw Summit, NATO recognised cyberspace as a domain of operations and Allies agreed on a Cyber Defence Pledge to prioritise the cyber defence of national networks and infrastructures. Most NATO nations have since significantly increased their efforts to strengthen cyber resilience, but the urgency of dealing with threats in cyberspace has only grown.

The need for a well-established framework of collective Allied response remains an issue. Cyber needs to be fully integrated into the planning and conduct of NATO operations. NATO as an organisation will not develop its own offensive cyber capabilities, but it could use voluntary contributions by the Allies. Some nations, like the UK, have already offered their national cyber capabilities for NATO's operations.<sup>16</sup>

Cyber is also one of the fields in which the importance of close NATO-EU cooperation is paramount. There are a number of areas in which the two organisations should further

enhance information sharing and develop common policies to respond to cyber-attacks, which remain below NATO's Article 5 threshold and could thus be called a "grey zone".

- *When strengthening its defence and deterrence posture, the Alliance needs to ensure that the cyber domain is an integral part of it. The Summit should encourage Allies to make their cyber capabilities available for Alliance use and agree to review NATO's cyber-related policies, including on the issue of how NATO should collectively respond to cyber-attacks.*

<sup>13</sup> European Council/Council of the European Union, "[Permanent Structured Cooperation \(PESCO\) first collaborative PESCO projects – Overview](#)".

<sup>14</sup> European Commission, "[Action Plan on military mobility: EU takes steps towards a Defence Union](#)", Press Release, 28 March 2018.

<sup>15</sup> An example of such an agreement has been reached between the Baltic states: see Estonian Ministry of Defence, "[Estonia concluded a political agreement with Latvia and Lithuania for the rapid movement of NATO Allied Forces](#)", 16 February 2017.

<sup>16</sup> UK Government, "[Defence Secretary's speech at Cyber 2017 Chatham House Conference](#)", 27 June 2017.

- *NATO and the EU should develop a common framework on how to respond to threats and activities in the cybersphere. The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn could serve as an excellent institution for developing this cooperation.*

## 5. CHALLENGES ON THE SOUTHERN FLANK

The Southern flank poses a set of unique challenges to the Alliance, with complex and diverse threats from both state and non-state actors.<sup>17</sup> As the unity and solidarity of NATO is based on the indivisibility of security, projecting and strengthening stability in the south of the Alliance is important for keeping its coherence and solidarity strong.

The NATO Strategic South Hub in Naples, which was inaugurated in September 2017, is an important initiative to enhance dialogue and cooperation between the Allies and partner countries in the Middle East and North Africa covering current and evolving security issues such as destabilisation, terrorism, radicalisation, migration, and environmental concerns.<sup>18</sup> NATO is also continuing its involvement in the

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Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan to provide the support that the Afghan government has requested to help the country fully provide for its own security, and is preparing for the new NATO Training and

Capacity Building Mission in Iraq, which will be launched at the Brussels Summit.<sup>19</sup>

As the Alliance's threat assessments, security challenges and policies in its east and south are different in nature, so are the response capabilities needed to tackle these threats and challenges. More political and military will needs to be invested in enhancing security in the whole of the NATO area, but the debates over the issue of East versus South should not become a divisive issue for the Alliance before and during the Summit.

*As the unity and solidarity of NATO is based on the indivisibility of security, projecting and strengthening stability in the south of the Alliance is important for keeping its coherence and solidarity strong*

- *A commitment to manning the NATO Strategic Hub in Naples should be agreed by all the Allies.*

## 6. OPEN DOOR POLICY

Although no new invitations to join the Alliance are expected at the Brussels Summit, NATO's enlargement policy serves both aspirant countries and the Allies. It cements security and stability in Europe and provides a strong incentive to implement domestic reforms which enhance regional stability and help to build a Europe that is whole, free and at peace.

The Brussels Summit takes place ten years after the Bucharest Summit declared that NATO welcomed Ukraine's and Georgia's Euro-

<sup>17</sup> Sinan Ulgen and Can Kasapoglu, "[A Threat Based Strategy for NATO's Southern Flank](#)", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 10 June 2016.

<sup>18</sup> NATO, "[NATO Strategic Direction South Hub inaugurated](#)", Press Release, 5 September 2017.

<sup>19</sup> NATO, "[Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg following the morning meeting of the North Atlantic Council \(NAC\) in Foreign Ministers' session](#)", Press Release, 27 April 2018.

Atlantic aspirations for membership and agreed that these countries would become members.<sup>20</sup>

The Summit will not issue invitations to either of these countries, but a meeting of the NATO-Georgia Council at head of state and government level will be held, which will encourage Georgia to continue on the path of NATO integration.<sup>21</sup> A meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Council at the Summit would be an important signal to show solidarity with Ukraine. Efforts to resolve the dispute with Hungary over Ukraine's new law on minority languages before the Summit are needed for the meeting to take place.<sup>22</sup> Progress can also be made towards issuing an invitation to Macedonia if the issue of the country's name is resolved before the Summit.<sup>23</sup> Bosnia and Herzegovina can move forward with its Membership Action Plan if the so-called Tallinn criteria are fulfilled.<sup>24</sup>

- *The Summit declaration should reiterate that NATO's Open Door policy will continue, based on Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which underlines a country's right to choose its security arrangements and cannot and will not be determined or vetoed by third countries.*
- *The Summit declaration should also encourage aspirant countries to continue implementing domestic reforms with the aim of joining the Alliance in the future.*

<sup>20</sup> NATO, "[Bucharest Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008](#)", Press Release (2008) 049, 3 April 2008.

<sup>21</sup> "[Stoltenberg Invites Georgian President to NATO 2018 Summit](#)", *Georgia Today*, 11 March 2018.

<sup>22</sup> "[U.S., NATO Urge Hungary, Ukraine To Settle Language-Law Dispute](#)", *Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty*, 14 February, 2018.

<sup>23</sup> "[Macedonia Puts Four Options Forward to Resolve Name Dispute](#)", *The Guardian*, 27 February 2018.

<sup>24</sup> NATO, "[Bosnia and Herzegovina and Membership Action Plan](#)", 22 April 2010.

## 7. NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS

Although Russia is not a separate topic at the Summit, most of NATO's deterrence and defence policies are specifically related to it. In recent years, Russia's actions and rhetoric have disrupted stability and security in Europe and a negative trend in the relationship will continue as no positive changes in Russia's policies are to be expected in the foreseeable future.

*In recent years, Russia's actions and rhetoric have disrupted stability and security in Europe and a negative trend in the relationship will continue as no positive changes in Russia's policies are to be expected in the foreseeable future*

Since the 2014 annexation of Crimea, NATO has developed a dual-track policy of deterrence and dialogue with Russia, with some states in favour of more deterrence and others in favour of more dialogue. Practical cooperation between NATO and Russia has been stopped, but meetings of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) at ambassadorial level have not been suspended, and military and political channels remain open to reduce the risk of military incidents. The new "normal" in relations with Russia requires adequate responses in all areas and domains. In addition to conventional military preparedness, NATO is discussing how to respond to the various types of hybrid threat that are affecting international relations and security issues posed by "little green men", information and influence operations, or cyber-attacks. No NRC meetings are scheduled at the Summit, but a conditions-based dual-track approach of deterrence and meaningful dialogue remains NATO's guiding principle in its relations with Russia.

- *Russia's continuous malign actions have strengthened the West's common policies. These policies will need to continue until Russia changes its course of confrontation and violation of the international order. Threats posed by Russia are no longer related only to its immediate neighbours.*

*NATO therefore needs to enhance further coherent policies to respond to both conventional and hybrid threats posed by Russia.*

## CONCLUSIONS

A strong message of NATO's unity and preparedness to deal with any threats against the Alliance's territory should be the main focus of the Brussels Summit.

All members of the Alliance need to commit to more equal burden-sharing and meet commonly agreed defence spending objectives.

It is evident that Russia will continue to challenge NATO both conventionally and by hybrid means, which requires a proper response by the Alliance. At the Summit, NATO needs to provide guidance on addressing the existing deficiencies in its overall posture to guarantee credible collective defence and deterrence.

The Alliance must focus on joint enablement, including air and maritime support of the eFP and the Baltic operational area as a whole. This would acknowledge the urgent need to address the key capability shortfalls in Baltic air defence and strengthening NATO's maritime presence in the Baltic Sea.

As part of the review of the NATO Command Structure and resulting changes to the Force Structure, proper command-and-control arrangements need to be agreed and implemented for collective defence operations. A divisional HQ located on the territory of the Baltic states should be established.

Allies should agree on a NATO readiness initiative to increase the number of forces available to react with greater speed to an emerging crisis. Furthermore, live deployment exercises to test and practise NATO's ability to rapidly reinforce forces in an operational theatre should be initiated. These aspects should be included in advanced defence planning.

The Summit should issue a strong statement on nuclear capability as a fundamental element of NATO's deterrent.

NATO and the EU should together issue a military mobility pledge to simplify and speed up procedures for forces to cross borders. NATO and the EU should develop a common framework on how to respond to threats and activities in the cybersphere. Cyber aspects must be included as an integral part of NATO's overall defence and deterrence posture.

The Alliance will continue to follow a 360-degree approach to security, which also means that the concerns of southern Allies should be properly addressed. The Summit should reinstate the validity of NATO's Open Door policy and encourage aspirant countries to take further steps in preparation for future membership.

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